We study the ine ciency and computation of pure Nash equilibria in unweighted congestion games, where the strategies of each player i are given implicitly by the binary vectors of a polytope P i . Given these polytopes, a strategy pro le naturally corresponds to an integral vector in the aggregation polytope P N = i P i . We identify two general properties of the aggregation polytope P N that are su cient for our results to go through, namely the integer decomposition property (IDP) and the box-totally dual integrality property (box-TDI). Intuitively, the IDP is needed to decompose a load pro le in P N into a respective strategy pro le of the players, and box-TDI ensures that the intersection of a polytope with an arbitrary integer box is an integral polytope. Examples of polytopal congestion games which satisfy IDP and box-TDI include common source network congestion games, symmetric totally unimodular congestion games, non-symmetric matroid congestion games and symmetric matroid intersection congestion games (in particular, r -arborescences and strongly base-orderable matroids).
INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivation. Congestion games constitute an important class of non-cooperative games which have been studied intensively since their introduction by Rosenthal (1973) . In a congestion game, a ( nite) set of players compete over a ( nite) set of resources. Each resource is associated with a non-negative and non-decreasing cost (or delay) function which speci es its cost depending on the total number of players using it. Every player chooses a subset of resources from a set of available resource subsets (corresponding to the player's strategies) and experiences a cost equal to the sum of the costs of the chosen resources. e goal of each player is to minimize her individual cost. Congestion games are both theoretically appealing and practically relevant. For example, they nd their applications in network routing, resource allocation and scheduling problems.
In a seminal paper, Rosenthal (1973) establishes the existence of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games. He proves this result through the use of an exact potential function which assigns a value to each strategy pro le such that the di erence in potential value of any two strategy pro les corresponding to a unilateral deviation of a player is equal to the di erence in cost experienced by that player. Rosenthal proves that every congestion game admits an exact potential function, also known as Rosenthal's potential. As a consequence, every best response sequence must converge to a pure Nash equilibrium because the game is nite. Further, this shows that the set of pure Nash equilibria corresponds to the set of local minima of Rosenthal's potential. Especially this correspondence has helped to shed light on several important aspects of congestion games in recent years.
Rosenthal's Potential: Local vs. Global Minimizers. One of the most predominant aspects that has been studied intensively in recent years is the computational complexity of nding a pure Nash equilibrium. In a seminal paper, Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar (2004) show that the problem of nding a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, both for symmetric congestion games and non-symmetric network congestion games. In particular, this suggests that a polynomial time algorithm for nding a pure Nash equilibrium is unlikely to exist for these games. In their proof they construct instances of non-symmetric network congestion games where any best response sequence has exponential length. Ackermann, Röglin, and Vöcking (2008) strengthen this result by exhibiting instances of symmetric network congestion games for which every best response sequence (from certain initial con gurations) has exponential length. On the positive side, they prove that best response dynamics converge in polynomial time for non-symmetric matroid congestion games, where the available resource subsets of the players correspond to bases of a given matroid (see below for formal de nitions). e authors also show that basically this is the only class of congestion games for which this property holds true.
Most previous works in this context focus on the analysis of decentralized dynamics to reach a pure Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Ackermann et al. (2008) ; Chien and Sinclair (2007) ; Christodoulou et al. (2012) ; Even-Dar et al. (2007) ; Fabrikant et al. (2004) ; Fotakis (2010) ; Ieong et al. (2005) ); said di erently, these works focus on nding a local minimum of Rosenthal's potential. Much less is known about the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium that corresponds to a global minimum. Fabrikant et al. (2004) use this idea to show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for symmetric network congestion games. e authors observe that in this case a global minimum of Rosenthal's potential can be computed by a reduction to a min-cost ow problem (if all cost functions are non-decreasing). Note that this is in stark contrast with the fact that best response dynamics might need exponential time in this case (Ackermann et al. 2008) .
Only very recently, Del Pia, Ferris, and Michini (2017) make further progress along these lines. e authors consider congestion games where the strategy sets of the players are given implicitly by a polyhedral description (see also (Chan and Jiang 2016) ). More precisely, for each player i the incidence vectors of the strategies are de ned as the binary vectors in a polytope P i = {x : A i x ≤ b i }, where A i is an integral matrix and b i is an integral vector. ey (mostly) focus on the case where the matrix A i is totally unimodular (see below for formal de nitions) and thus the describing polytope P i is integral (i.e., all its extreme points are integral); they term these games totally unimodular (TU) congestion games. For symmetric TU congestion games (when all A i , b i are identical), they devise an aggregation/decomposition framework that reduces the problem of nding a global minimum of Rosenthal's potential to an integer linear programming problem. Using this framework, they show that pure Nash equilibria can be computed e ciently for symmetric TU congestion games.
e authors also show that this problem is PLS-complete for non-symmetric TU congestion games. Further, they show that their framework can be adapted to the case of non-symmetric matroid congestion games.
Another important aspect that has has been the subject of intensive research in recent years is the ine ciency of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games (see, e.g., Aland et al. (2011); Awerbuch et al. (2005) ; Caragiannis et al. (2006) ; Christodoulou and Gairing (2016) ; Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (2005); de Jong et al. (2016); Feldman et al. (2016); Fotakis (2010) ; Gairing et al. (2008) ; Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999); Roughgarden (2015) ). Here the goal is to assess the social cost (de ned as the sum of the costs of the players) of a pure Nash equilibrium relative to an optimal outcome. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) introduced the price of anarchy as the ratio between the worst social cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social cost of an optimum. Anshelevich et al. (2004) de ned the price of stability as the ratio between the best social cost of a Nash equilibrium and the social cost of an optimum. Fotakis (2010) reveals an intriguing connection between the price of stability of network congestion games and the price of anarchy of their non-atomic counterparts. More speci cally, he shows that for symmetric network congestion games the ratio between the social cost of a global minimum of Rosenthal's potential and the social cost of a social optimum is at most ρ (D), where ρ (D) is a tight bound on the price of anarchy for non-atomic network congestion games with latency functions in class D introduced by Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses (2004) . In particular, this implies that the price of stability of symmetric network congestion games with cost functions in D is at most ρ (D). For example, this parameter equals 4/3 for the class of a ne functions and (27 + 6 √ 3)/23 ≈ 1.63 for quadratic functions. ese type of bounds fall within Roughgarden's smoothness framework (Roughgarden 2015) .
Our Contributions. In light of the discussion above a natural question that arises, and which we se le in this paper, is:
Which structural properties of the strategy sets of the players are su cient to (A) e ciently compute a global minimum of Rosenthal's potential, and (B) bound the ine ciency of the resulting pure Nash equilibrium?
In order to tackle this question, we use a polyhedral approach similar to the ones by Chan and Jiang (2016) and Del Pia et al. (2017) . But in contrast to these works, we do not restrict our a ention to polyhedral descriptions arising from totally unimodular matrices only. Instead, we identify more general polyhedral properties of the describing systems that are su cient to achieve (A) and (B). Our main contribution in this paper is to unify and extend the results in (Del Pia et al. 2017; Fotakis 2010 ) to a much larger class of polytopal congestion games.
More speci cally, we consider polytopal congestion games in which the incidence vectors of the strategies of player i are given by the binary vectors in a polytope P i = {x : Ax ≤ b i }, where A is an integral matrix and b i is an integral vector. Given the polytopes of all players, a strategy pro le naturally corresponds to an integral vector in the aggregation polytope P N = i P i . We identify two general properties of the aggregation polytope P N which are su cient for our results to go through, namely the integer decomposition property (IDP) and the box-totally dual integrality property (box-TDI) (formal de nitions are given below). e integer decomposition property is needed to decompose a load pro le in P N to a respective strategy pro le of the players. Intuitively, the box-TDI property ensures that the intersection of a polytope with an arbitrary integer box is an integral polytope.
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Our main contributions for polytopal congestion games are as follows:
(1) We generalize the upper bound of ρ (D) on the price of stability for symmetric network congestion games by Fotakis (2010) to the much larger class of polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP and box-TDI (Section 4). To this aim, we introduce a novel property, which we term the symmetric di erence decomposition property, and show that it is satis ed by our polytopal congestion games. By exploiting this property, we can generalize the proof by Fotakis (2010) to these games. We also prove that our bounds are tight for these games. (2) We provide a framework to derive an e cient algorithm for computing a feasible load pro le minimizing Rosenthal's potential for polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP and box-TDI (Section 5). e time complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in the number of players and resources, the largest entry in i b i and the complexity of a separation oracle for the aggregation polytope. is generalizes the framework of Del Pia et al. (2017) for symmetric TU congestion games and non-symmetric matroid congestion games, both being special cases of our polytopal congestion games. (3) We give a series of examples of combinatorial polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP and box-TDI (Section 6). ese examples include the symmetric TU congestion games by Del Pia et al. (2017) , common source network congestion games, symmetric matroid intersection congestion games (in particular, r -arborescences and strongly base-orderable matroids) and non-symmetric matroid congestion games. (4) We show that the integer decomposition property and box-total dual integrality can be used to generalize and extend some results on the computation of strong equilibria in bo leneck congestion games studied by Harks, Hoefer, Klimm, and Skopalik (2013) (Section 7). In particular, we obtain the new result that strong equilibria can be computed in strongly polynomial time for symmetric totally unimodular bo leneck congestion games.
Further Implications and Signi cance. To the best of our knowledge, all previous works addressed either (A) or (B), but not both. Note that the combination of (A) and (B) provides an e cient algorithm for the computation of a pure Nash equilibrium that comes with a provable ine ciency guarantee. Said di erently, our contributions (1) and (2) can be seen as an e cient equilibrium selection procedure to nd a pure Nash equilibrium whose social cost is at most ρ (D) times the optimal social cost. By exploiting contribution (1), we obtain new bounds on the price of stability which improve upon the ones for general polynomial congestion games: Christodoulou and Gairing (2016) derive tight bounds on the price of stability of congestion games with polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d, which grow like d + 1. However, for the class (Feldman et al. 2016) ), which is a signi cant improvement over the general case. Also, ρ (D) is well-understood for various classes of delay functions D; for example, a closed form expression is known for ρ (D d ) (see preliminaries).
Our upper bound of ρ (D) on the price of stability is (asymptotically) tight, even for symmetric singleton congestion games with the class of delay functions D containing all constant functions and being closed under dilations (see below for formal de nitions). Note that singleton congestion games constitute a special case of all polytopal congestion games mentioned in (3). In particular, our results se le the exact price of stability for these applications.
Our results also reveal that the price of stability for matroid congestion games is much more well-behaved than the price of anarchy. de Jong et al. (2016) show that for symmetric k-uniform matroid congestion games with a ne cost functions, the price of anarchy lies strictly between 4/3 and 28/13 ≈ 2.15. Obtaining a tight bound for this case seems (highly) non-trivial. In contrast, for the price of stability we provide tight bounds for arbitrary non-symmetric matroid congestion games with arbitrary cost functions.
Our framework in (2) uni es and extends the aggregation/decomposition framework of Del Pia et al. (2017) . In particular, the symmetric TU congestion games and non-symmetric matroid congestion games (considered separately in (Del Pia et al. 2017) ) fall into our class of polytopal congestion games satisfying IDP and box-TDI. Similarly, all combinatorial TU congestion games (i.e., network, matching, edge cover, vertex cover and stable set congestion games) and their respective extensions to the maximum (or minimum) cardinality versions in (Del Pia et al. 2017) can be handled by our framework.
Contribution (2) can also be regarded as a "black-box" approach for the computation of a pure Nash equilibrium. Given a congestion game that exhibits some combinatorial structure, checking whether our approach applies reduces to the following three tasks: (i) derive a polytopal description P i for the strategy set of each player i, (ii) verify whether the resulting aggregation polytope P N satis es the IDP, (iii) check that the system describing the aggregation polytope P N is box-TDI. In particular, if the integer decomposition of P N can be done in polynomial time, then this approach provides an e cient algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium. By exploiting this idea, we derive strongly polynomial time algorithms for the computation of Rosenthal's potential minimum for all applications mentioned in (3).
It is interesting to note that the IDP seems to be the limiting property for our approach to apply. For example, non-symmetric network congestion games can naturally be modeled as polytopal congestion games satisfying box-TDI. But it is easy to see that the IDP does not hold. In fact, it is unlikely that an e cient algorithm to nd a pure Nash equilibrium exists because this problem is PLS-complete (Fabrikant et al. 2004 ).
PRELIMINARIES
Congestion Games and Rosenthal's Potential. A congestion game Γ is given by a tuple (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N , (c e ) e ∈E ), where N = [n] is a nite set of players, E = [m] is a nite set of resources (or facilities), S i ⊆ 2 E is a set of strategies of player i ∈ N , and c e : R ≥0 → R is a cost function of resource e ∈ E. Unless stated otherwise, the cost functions are assumed to be non-negative and non-decreasing. For a strategy pro le s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ × i S i , we de ne x e as the number of players using resource e, i.e., x e = x e (s) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ s i }|. We call x the load pro le corresponding to strategy pro le s. e cost of player i ∈ N under a strategy pro le s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ × i S i is given by C i (s) = e ∈s i c e (x e ). If S i = S j for all i, j ∈ N , the game is called symmetric. e social cost C (s) of a strategy pro le refers to the sum of the players' individual costs, i.e., C (s) = i C i (s).
We say that Φ : × i S i → R is an exact potential function for a congestion game Γ if for every strategy pro le s ∈ × i S i , for every player i ∈ N and every unilateral deviation s i ∈ S i of i it holds:
c e (k ) is an exact potential. Subsequently, we refer to this potential function simply as Rosenthal's potential. Further, a strategy pro le minimizing Rosenthal's potential is said to be a Rosenthal minimizer.
Ine ciency of equilibria. A strategy pro le s is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N it holds that C i (s) ≤ C i (s i , s −i ) for all s i ∈ S i . Further, a strategy pro le s is a strong equilibrium if for every group of players I ⊆ N and every deviation s I ∈ × i ∈I S i of the players in I , it holds that 
where NE denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of Γ. For a collection of games H we de ne POA(H ) = sup Γ ∈H POA(Γ) and POS(H ) = sup Γ ∈H POS(Γ). ese notions naturally generalize to the solution concept of strong equilibria.
Smoothness parameter. Correa et al. (2004) show that for non-atomic network congestion games with latency functions in class D the price of anarchy of an instance is at most
e value of ρ (D) is well-understood for many important classes of latency functions. For example,
In particular, D d contains all polynomial latency functions with non-negative coe cients and maximum degree d.
plays a crucial role in bounding the price of stability of our congestion games.
Integral polytopes. We review some basic de nitions and results from polyhedral combinatorics which are used in this paper. A polytope P ⊆ R m is the convex hull of a nite set of vectors in R m . We say that P is integral if all its extreme points are integral vectors. P is said to be box-integral if the intersection of P with any integral box, i.e., P ∩ {x : c ≤ x ≤ d} for arbitrary integral c and d, yields an integral polytope.
A matrix A ∈ Q r ×m is totally unimodular (TUM) if the determinant of each square submatrix of A is in {0, ±1}. In particular, each entry of a totally unimodular matrix is in {0, ±1}. If A is totally unimodular and b ∈ Z m is an integer vector, then the polyhedron P = {x : Ax ≤ b} is integral (Schrijver 1986, eorem 19.1) . Edmonds and Giles (1977) introduced the powerful notion of total dual integrality. A rational system Ax ≤ b with A ∈ Q r ×m and b ∈ Q r is totally dual integral (TDI) if for every integral c ∈ Z m , the dual of minimizing c T x over Ax ≤ b, i.e., max{ T b : ≥ 0, T A = c T }, has an integer optimum solution , if it is nite. If Ax ≤ b is a TDI-system and b is integral, then the polyhedron P = {x : Ax ≤ b} is integral (Schrijver 1986, Corollary 22.1c) . Note that TDI is a weaker su cient condition for the integrality of P than TUM.
e system Ax ≤ b is box-totally dual integral (box-TDI) if the system Ax ≤ b, l ≤ x ≤ u is TDI for all rational vectors l and u. We say that a polytope P is box-TDI, if it can be described by a box-TDI system. If P has some box-TDI describing system, then every TDI-system describing P is also box-TDI (Schrijver 1986, eorem 22.8 ). We will use the following properties of box-TDI descriptions: P 2.1. (Schrijver 1986 , Section 22.5) e following statements are equivalent: (i) e system Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 is box-TDI.
(ii) e system Ax + µ = b, µ ≥ 0, x ≥ 0 is box-TDI. (iii) e system Ax ≤ αb, x ≥ 0 is box-TDI for all α ≥ 0. (iv) e system aζ 0 + Ax ≤ b is box-TDI, where a is a column of A and ζ 0 is a new variable. Moreover, if a polytope P is box-integral, then every edge of P is in the direction of a {0, ±1}-vector.
For our computational results we need the notion of a separation oracle. Let P ∈ R m be a polytope de ned by a nite set of rational inequalities. Given a vector ∈ Q n , we assume that there is a separation oracle that decides whether ∈ P or not, and in the la er case it returns a vector a ∈ Q n such that a T x < a T for all x ∈ P. All applications that we consider in this paper are known to have e cient separation oracles. Finally, for a vector ∈ Q r we de ne the size of as size( ) = max{log( i ) + 1 : i = 1, . . . , r }.
Matroids. We introduce some general terminology and facts for matroids (an extensive treaty of matroids can be found, e.g., in (Schrijver 2003) ). Let E be a nite set of elements and I ⊆ 2 E be a collection of subsets of E (called independent sets). e pair M = (E, I) is a matroid if the following three properties hold: (1) ∅ ∈ I, (2) if A ∈ I and B ⊆ A, then B ∈ I, (3) if A, B ∈ I and |A| > |B|, then there exists an a ∈ A \ B such that B + a ∈ I. An independent set B ∈ I of maximum size is called a basis. We use B to denote the set of all bases of M. e matroid M also has a rank function r : 2 E → {1, . . . , |E|} which maps every subset A ⊆ E to the cardinality of the largest independent set contained in A.
e base matroid polytope is given by
where
It is the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the bases in B (Schrijver 2003) . If in the description above the equality
we obtain the independent set polytope which is the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the independent sets. We assume that the matroid is given by an independence oracle that takes as input a subset A ⊆ 2 E and returns whether or not A ∈ I. Given an independence oracle, we can determine in time polynomial in |E| and the complexity of the oracle, whether a set is a basis and what the rank of a set is. Further, there exists a separation oracle for P M that runs in time polynomial in |E| and the complexity of an independence oracle. is follows from the fact that the most violated inequality problem can be solved in time polynomial in |E| and the complexity of an independence oracle.
e most violated inequality problem takes as input a vector x ∈ Q m and returns whether or not x ∈ P, and if not, it returns a subset A for which r (A) − x (A) is minimized, see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Section 40.3) .
Given two matroids M 1 and M 2 on a common ground set E, the polytope
is the convex hull of the common bases of matroids M 1 and M 2 , see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 41.12d) . It follows directly that P M 1 , M 2 also has a separation oracle which runs in time polynomial in |E| and the complexity of the independence oracles for M 1 and M 2 .
POLYTOPAL CONGESTION GAMES
We consider polytopal congestion games
, where the set of strategies S i of each player i ∈ N is given implicitly by a polytopal representation. More precisely, let X i be the nite set of all incidence vectors of the strategies of player i, i.e., X i = {χ i ∈ {0, 1} m : χ ie = 1 i e ∈ s i for s i ∈ S i }. e polytope P i representing the strategies of player i is de ned as the convex hull of X i , i.e., P i = conv(X i ) ⊆ [0, 1] m . We assume that P i is given by
where A ∈ Z r ×m is an integral r × m-matrix and b i ∈ Z r is an integral vector. Note that X i = P i ∩ {0, 1} m . For notational convenience, we subsequently use S i also to refer to the set of incidence vectors X i ; no confusion shall arise. We say that (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) is the polytopal tuple given by P 1 , . . . , P n , where S i = P i ∩ {0, 1} m . Moreover, we de ne P N = { : A ≤ i b i } ⊆ R m to be the aggregation polytope of the tuple. If b i = b j = b for all i, j ∈ N , the tuple is called symmetric and denoted by (N , E, S) where S = P ∩ {0, 1} m , with P = {x : Ax ≤ b}. If additionally we equip the tuple with cost functions (c e ) e ∈E , we call Γ = (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N , (c e ) e ∈E ) the polytopal congestion game given by P 1 , . . . , P n .
Aggregation Polytope: IDP and box-TDI
We identify two crucial properties that the aggregation polytope P N has to satisfy for our results to go through:
(1) P N satis es the integer decomposition property (IDP). (2) e system A ≤ i b i describing P N is box-totally dual integral (box-TDI).
e aggregation polytope P N = { : A ≤ i b i } ⊆ R m has the integer decomposition property (IDP) if every integral z ∈ P N can be wri en as z = n i=1 z i , where z i ∈ P i ∩ Z m for all i = 1, . . . , n. 1 We next introduce the notion of a feasible load pro le. Given a tuple (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ), a load pro le ∈ N m is said to be feasible for (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) if there exists a strategy pro le s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ × i S i such that is the load pro le corresponding to s, i.e., e = x e (s) for all e ∈ E. We omit the explicit reference to the tuple if it is clear from the context. e IDP is crucial to establish a correspondence between feasible load pro les for (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) and the integral vectors in P N . P 3.1. If the aggregation polytope P N of a polytopal tuple (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) has the IDP, then the feasible load pro les of the tuple correspond precisely to the integral vectors in P N .
P
. Let s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ × i S i be a strategy pro le and let x be the load pro le corresponding to s. It follows directly that x ∈ P N by de nition of P N . Moreover, any integral vector z in P N can be decomposed as z = n i=1 z i where z i ∈ P i ∩ Z m for all i = 1, . . . , n. is implies that for every i the vector z i is the incidence vector of some strategy of player i and thus z is a feasible load pro le. e main reason as to why box-TDI is useful, is that it serves as a su cient condition to show that the polytope it describes is box-integral. P 3.2. If the system Ax ≤ b describing a polytope P is box-TDI and b is integral, then P is box-integral.
. By assumption, the describing system Ax ≤ b of P is box-TDI. us the system Ax ≤ b, l ≤ ≤ u is TDI for all rational vectors l and u. In particular, Ax ≤ b, c ≤ ≤ d is TDI for arbitrary integral vectors c and d. Because b, c and d are integral, we can conclude that the polytope P ∩ { : c ≤ ≤ d} is integral (see, e.g., (Schrijver 1986, Corollary 22.1c) ).
It seems that most 0/1-polytopes for which the integer decomposition property is known in the literature, also have a box-TDI describing system. We do not know if this is true in general, but it would imply that the box-TDI assumption is redundant in all our statements below.
PRICE OF STABILITY
We rst introduce the symmetric di erence decomposition property. is property is crucial to derive the bound on the price of stability.
Symmetric Di erence Decomposition Property
De nition 4.1 (Symmetric di erence decomposition). A tuple (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) satis es the symmetric di erence decomposition property (SDD) if for all feasible load pro les f and , there exist vectors a 1 , . . . , a q ∈ {0, ±1} m such that − f = q k =1 a k , and, for all k = 1, . . . , q, the load pro le f + a k is feasible and a k satis es a k e = −1 ⇒ f e − e > 0 and a k e = 1 ⇒ f e − e < 0.
As an example, let us consider symmetric network congestion games, where the common strategy set of all players is the set of all directed simple s, t-paths in some directed graph G = (V , A) with s, t ∈ V . Here each feasible load pro le corresponds to an integral feasible s, t-ows of value n = |N |. e symmetric di erence of two ows f and can be wri en as the sum of unit circuit ows on cycles. 2 e incidence vectors of these unit circuit ows correspond to the vectors a k in De nition 4.1. e following theorem establishes the symmetric di erence decomposition property.
be a polytopal tuple given by P 1 , . . . , P n and let P N be the corresponding aggregation polytope. If P N satis es the IDP and has a box-TDI description, then the tuple has the symmetric di erence decomposition property.
P
. We start by adding slack-variables to the system A ≤ i ∈N b i describing P N . Note that by Proposition 2.1 (ii) box-TDI is preserved under adding slack variables. As a result, we obtain the polytope
for which its describing system is box-TDI. Also, Q N is integral. Let f and be two feasible load pro les with f . By Proposition 3.1, we have f , ∈ P N . erefore, there are non-negative integral slack vectors τ , σ such that ( f , τ ), ( , σ ) ∈ Q N . Let f = ( f , τ ) and = ( , σ ). Observe that τ and σ are integral because of the integrality of A, i b i and f and , respectively.
Note that the pairs f = ( f , τ ) and = ( , σ ) are vectors in Z m+r since A is an r × m-matrix. Let c, d ∈ Z m+r be vectors de ned by c j = min{ f j , j } and d j = max{ f j , j } for j = 1, . . . , r + m, and let B be the integral box de ned by B = {z : c ≤ z ≤ d} ⊆ R m+r . L 4.3. e polytope Q N ∩ B is integral and every edge of Q N ∩ B is in the direction of a {0, ±1}-vector.
. e integrality follows from box-TDI of the integral system Q N . For the second part of the claim, we rst show that Q N ∩ B is box-integral. Note that Q N is box-integral by Proposition 3.2. Let B = {x : γ ≤ x ≤ δ } ∈ Z m+r be an arbitrary integral box. Note that (Q N ∩B)∩B = Q N ∩(B∩B ) and that B ∩ B is again an integral box, since B is integral as well (because f and are integral). It follows that Q N ∩ (B ∩ B ) is an integral polytope. us, (Q N ∩ B) ∩ B is integral which proves that Q N ∩ B is box-integral. e claim now follows from Proposition 2.1.
Note that f , ∈ Q N ∩ B. Further, both f and are extreme points of this polytope because they are extreme points of the box B. We now x some edge of Q N ∩ B containing f . Such an edge must exist because Q N ∩ B contains at least two elements (since f ). Let (a 1 ) = (a 1 , µ 1 ) be the non-zero {0, ±1}-vector describing the direction of the edge. 3 Since Q N ∩ B is an integral polytope we can show that f + (a 1 ) ∈ Q N ∩ B. To see this, let h(λ) = f + λ · (a 1 ) be a parametrization of the edge for some range 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ * , where h = h(λ * ) is the other extreme point of the edge (a 1 ) . Since f is integral and (a 1 ) a {0, ±1}-vector, it must be that λ * is a strictly positive integer.
We have shown that f + (a 1 ) ∈ Q N ∩ B. It follows that A( f + a 1 ) + (τ + µ 1 ) = i ∈N b i . us, Aa 1 + µ 1 = 0 because Af + τ = i ∈N b i . Moreover, by construction of the box B it follows that
for j = 1, . . . , r + m. Using the fact that Aa 1 + µ 1 = 0, it now also follows that − (a 1 ) j ∈ Q N ∩ B. To see this, note that A( − a 1 ) + (σ − µ 1 ) = A + σ − (Aa 1 + µ 1 ) = i ∈N b i + 0. Moreover, we also have − (a 1 ) ≥ 0 by construction, since if (a 1 ) j = 1 for some j then j > f j ≥ 0, so in particular j − 1 ≥ 0 (because of the integrality of j ).
We can now apply the same argument to the vectors f and − (a 1 ) in order to obtain a vector (a 2 ) satisfying (4) and for which f + (a 2 ) , − (a 1 ) − (a 2 ) ∈ Q N . Repeating this procedure we nd vectors (a 1 ) , . . . , (a q ) satisfying (4), and such that
We argue that this process terminates. For the K-th step of this procedure, we have by construction of the (a k ) ,
where || · || 1 is the L 1 -norm. Since f , and the a k are all integral this guarantees that the expression T (K ) decreases by at least one in every step. We conclude the proof by showing that f and can be decomposed according to De nition 4.1. We have (a k ) = (a k , µ k ) as de ned before. It then follows that a 1 , . . . , a q are vectors satisfying (3) such that − f = q k=1 a k with f + a k ∈ P N for k = 1, . . . , q. Note that a k might be the zero-vector, if (a k ) only contained non-zero elements in the part of the vector corresponding to slack variables. ese a k can be le out. It remains to show that f + a k corresponds to a feasible strategy pro le for k = 1, . . . , q. is follows directly from the fact that P N has the IDP. e decomposition yields the strategies of the players.
For symmetric polytopal tuples with common polytope P, we have P N = nP = { : /n ∈ P }. e la er polytope has a box-TDI description if and only if P has a box-TDI description, which follows from Proposition 2.1 (iii). is yields the following corollary. C 4.4. Let (N , E, S) be a symmetric polytopal tuple given by P. If P satis es the IDP and has a box-TDI description, then the tuple has the symmetric di erence decomposition property.
Upper bound for price of stability
e following is the main result of this section.
e ∈E ) be a congestion game with cost functions in class D. Suppose that the tuple (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) satis es the symmetric di erence decomposition property. en POS(Γ) ≤ ρ (D). Further, this bound is (asymptotically) tight, even for symmetric singleton congestion games.
Recall that ρ (D) is de ned as in (1) and refers to the price of anarchy of non-atomic network congestion games with latency function in class D. We need the following lemma to prove eorem 4.5. Its proof relies on the symmetric di erence decomposition property. L 4.6. Let (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) satisfy the symmetric di erence decomposition property and let (c e ) e ∈E be arbitrary cost functions. Let f be a feasible load pro le that minimizes Rosenthal's potential Φ(·). en for every feasible load pro le
( f e − e )c e ( f e ) − e:f e < e ( e − f e )c e ( f e + 1) ≤ 0.
P
. Let f be a global minimizer of Rosenthal's potential and let be an arbitrary feasible load pro le. en by the SDD property, there exist vectors a 1 , . . . , a q such that − f = q k=1 a k for some q. Moreover,
c e ( f e + 1) ≤ 0 for all k = 1, . . . , q, where the inequality holds because f minimizes Rosenthal's potential Φ. By adding up these inequalities for all k = 1, . . . , q, we obtain that ∆( f , ) ≤ 0. To see this, note that if e ∈ E with f e > e then there are precisely f e − e vectors a k with a k e = −1; similarly, if e ∈ E with e > f e then there are precisely e − f e vectors a k with a k e = 1. P T 4.5. e upper bound proof follows the same line of arguments as in (Fotakis 2010, Lemma 3) . We sketch the main ideas here only and refer to (Fotakis 2010 ) for more details. Let f be a minimizer of Rosenthal's potential and an arbitrary feasible load pro le. Note that f is a pure Nash equilibrium. It can be shown that
( f e − e )c e ( f e ) − e:f e < e ( e − f e )c e ( f e + 1).
By Lemma 4.6, the sum di erence ∆( f , ) is non-negative. By rearranging terms, we obtain
, which establishes the upper bound. e proof that this bound is tight will be given in the full version of the paper.
MINIMIZING ROSENTHAL'S POTENTIAL
Del Pia, Ferris, and Michini (2017) introduce an aggregation/decomposition method for computing a global minimum of Rosenthal's potential. It consists of two phases: In the aggregation phase, we nd a feasible load pro le f * minimizing Rosenthal's potential. In the decomposition phase, f * is then decomposed into a feasible strategy pro le. e authors provide an aggregation approach (detailed below) that works for totally unimodular matrices A and one common vector b = b i for all i ∈ N . Here we extend this result to aggregation polytopes P N that have a box-TDI description.
Recall from Proposition 3.1 that if the aggregation polytope P N of a polytopal congestion game has the integer decomposition property, then the feasible load pro les correspond to the integral vectors of P N . As a result, the problem we need to solve in the aggregation phase is equivalent to
Note that this formulation is not a linear program in the variables ( f e ) e ∈E . As in the approach of Del Pia et al. (2017) , this problem can be resolved by introducing binary variables h k j ∈ {0, 1} for k = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m. e interpretation is that h k j = 1 if at least k players are using resource j ∈ E, and h k j = 0 otherwise. In particular, if the cost functions (c e ) e ∈E are non-decreasing, 1 Pieter Kleer and Guido Schäfer then the aggregation problem (Z ) is equivalent to the problem (R) stated below:
e equivalence of (Z ) and (R) follows from the following observations:
is an optimal solution for (R), then the vector f de ned by f j = n k=1 h k j is feasible for (Z ). Note that here we implicitly exploit that the cost functions are non-decreasing.
We show that the integer program (R) can be solved e ciently for box-TDI aggregation polytopes. L 5.1. If P N has a box-TDI description and A is a {0, ±1}-matrix, then (R) can be solved in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of P N .
P
. De ne A = [A, A, . . . , A] ∈ Z r ×mn and h = (h k j ) ∈ Q mn . e relaxation of the integral system (5) and (6) can then be wri en as the system A h
be the polytope described by this system. We rst show that Q N is integral. By assumption the description of P N = { f : Af ≤ i ∈N b i } is box-TDI. In particular, by applying Proposition 2.1(iv) repeatedly, we obtain that the system
is box-TDI as well. In particular, this implies that the system A h ≤ i b i , 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 is TDI because the intersection of a box-TDI system with an arbitrary box yields a TDI system. Because i b i and the restrictions on h are integral vectors, we conclude that Q N is indeed integral. We now show how to construct a separation oracle for Q N from a separation oracle for P N . For
. . , h n 1 , . . . , h n m ) ∈ Q mn , let the aggregated vector f ∈ Q m be de ned as f j = n k=1 h k j for j = 1, . . . , m. en h ∈ Q N if and only if f ∈ P N . We now give a separation oracle for Q N . Let = ( k j ) ∈ Q mn be an arbitrary rational vector and let f be de ned as above. We use the separation oracle of P N to check if f ∈ P N or not. If f ∈ P N , then also h ∈ Q N and we are done. Otherwise if f P N the oracle returns a vector a ∈ Q m such that a T x < a T f for all x ∈ P N . In particular this means that (a T , a T , . . . , a T )z < (a T , a T , . . . , a T ) for all z = (z k j ) ∈ Q N . us, we obtain a separation oracle for Q N . We now conclude the proof with a running-time analysis. From the claims above, it follows that we can e ciently solve (R) with the ellipsoid method. In particular, by (Schrijver 1986, Corollary 14.1a) this can be done in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ), size(c e ) for e ∈ E, and the running time of the separation oracle for P N . Frank and Tardos (1987) show that for every linear program max{c T x : Ax ≤ b} with a {0, ±1}-matrix A, the objective function c can be replaced by an objective function c , which is polynomially bounded in m, that yields the same set of optimal solutions. e function c can be computed in strongly polynomial time. is concludes the proof.
We obtain the following main result from the discussion above.
e ∈E ) be a polytopal congestion game with aggregation polytope P N that satis es the IDP and has a box-TDI description. en a feasible load pro le minimizing Rosenthal's potential can be computed in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of P N . For symmetric polytopal congestion games we obtain the following corollary. C 5.3. Let Γ = (N , E, S, (c e ) e ∈E ) be a symmetric polytopal congestion game given by P. If P satis es the IDP and has a box-TDI description, then a feasible load pro le minimizing Rosenthal's potential can be computed in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ), and the complexity of a separation oracle of P.
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no universal algorithm that can perform integer decomposition of an arbitrary polytope satisfying the IDP in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of a separation oracle. However, under a slightly stronger integer decomposition property such a decomposition can be done as explained below. Here we focus on symmetric congestion games for clarity; but these arguments can be extended to the non-symmetric case as well (details will be given in the full version of the paper).
We say that a polytope P satis es the middle integral decomposition property (McDiarmid 1983) if for n ∈ N and w ∈ Z m , the polytope P ∩ (w − (n − 1)P ) is integral. If this property is satis ed, the decomposition algorithm of Baum and Tro er (1978) can then be used to perform the integer decomposition; details are given in the proof of eorem 5.4.
e ∈E ) be a symmetric polytopal congestion game given by P. If P satis es the middle integral decomposition property and has a box-TDI description, then a feasible strategy pro le minimizing Rosenthal's potential can be computed in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of P.
We remark that all results in this section also hold for computing a social optimum of congestion games with weakly convex cost functions, since this problem can be reduced to computing a global optimum of Rosenthal's potential (see (Del Pia et al. 2017) ).
APPLICATIONS
We now give examples of polytopal tuples (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N ) for which the aggregation polytope has the IDP (or middle integral decomposition property), a box-TDI description and an e cient separation oracle. As a consequence, our results on the price of stability ( eorem 4.5) and the computation of Rosenthal's potential minimizer ( eorem 5.2 and Corollary 5.3) apply.
Symmetric totally unimodular congestion games
Totally unimodular congestion games (Del Pia et al. 2017 ) capture a wide range of combinatorial congestion games. Here the common strategy set of the players is described by a polytope P = {x : Ax ≤ b} with a totally unimodular r × m-matrix A and an integral vector b. In particular, such a system satis es the IDP and is box-TDI. e integer decomposition property was shown by Baum and Tro er (1978) . We argue that the system is box-TDI. e constraint matrix describing the intersection of P with {x : c ≤ x ≤ d} for c, d ∈ Q m is again totally unimodular (Veino and Dantzig 1968) . Any totally unimodular system is TDI (see, e.g., (Schrijver 1986 , Section 22.1)), and therefore the system Ax ≤ b, c ≤ x ≤ d is TDI. We conclude that the system Ax ≤ b is box-TDI. If, as in (Del Pia et al. 2017) , the parameter r is considered as part of the input size as well, then there is a trivial (strongly) polynomial separation oracle that simply checks all inequalities of the system Ax ≤ b. For all combinatorial applications given in (Del Pia et al. 2017) , the parameter r is actually polynomially bounded in n and m, so then this assumption is justi ed.
Common source network congestion games
In a common source network congestion game we are given a directed graph G = (V , A) and a source s ∈ V . e strategy set of player i ∈ N is the set of all directed s, t i -paths for some t i ∈ V . '17, June 26-30, 2017 , Cambridge, MA, USA Ackermann et al. (2008 already showed that one can compute a global optimum of Rosenthal's potential function for these games. We outline how this case can be cast in our framework. e strategies of player i can be described by a polytope P i = {x : Ax = b i , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}, where A is the arc-incidence matrix of the network G, and b is the vector with (b i ) s = 1, (b i ) t i = −1 and zero otherwise. 5 e aggregation polytope is then P N = { : A = i ∈N b i , 0 ≤ ≤ n}. Any feasible load pro le minimizing Rosenthal's potential can be decomposed into a feasible strategy pro le, using a similar argument as in (Ackermann et al. 2008) . Further, the describing system of P N is totally unimodular and thus box-TDI.
Symmetric matroid intersection congestion games
In symmetric matroid intersection congestion games the (symmetric) strategy set of all players is given by the common bases of two matroids M 1 = (E, I 1 ) and M 2 = (E, I 2 ) over a common element set E. e polytope P of the players corresponds to the common base polytope P M 1 , M 2 as de ned in (2). e describing system of P is box-TDI (see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 41.12e) ). Further, as noted in the preliminaries there is a separation oracle for P (and thus P N ) which runs in time polynomial in |E| and the complexity of the independence oracles for M 1 and M 2 . However, it is not precisely known for which cases of matroid intersection the integer decomposition property holds.
Example 6.1 (r -Arborescences).
e set of all r -arboresences can be seen as the set of common bases of two matroids. e rst matroid M 1 is the graphic matroid on the undirected graph D = (V , A ), where A is the set formed by replacing every directed arc in A with its undirected version, i.e., A = {{u, } : (u, ) ∈ A}. e second matroid M 2 is the partition matroid in which independent sets are given by sets of arcs for which there is at most one incoming arc at every node r (we assume there are no incoming arcs at r ). us, the common base polytope P M 1 , M 2 describes the arborescences of D and we let P = P M 1 , M 2 .
We argue that there is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for computing a minimum of Rosenthal's potential. First note that the describing system of P M 1 , M 2 is box-TDI (see (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 41.12e) ). Also, P M 1 , M 2 satis es the integer decomposition property, which follows from Edmonds' Disjoint Arborescences eorem (Edmonds 2003) . By Corollary 5.3, we can compute a minimum of Rosenthal's potential in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of a separation oracle for P M 1 , M 2 . e elements of the vector b are bounded by |E|, by the de nition of the rank functions. Moreover, it is not hard to see that there exist independence oracles for both M 1 and M 2 that run in time polynomial in m. ese oracles can be used for separation oracles as described in the preliminaries. It is not hard to see that if both base matroid polytopes have a polynomial time separation oracle, then the intersection of these polytopes has one too. is shows that there is an algorithm for computing an optimal feasible load pro le in time polynomial in n and m. Integer decomposition can also be done in time polynomial in n and m (see, e.g., (Harks et al. 2013, eorem 5) ).
Example 6.2 (Intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids). A matroid M = (E, I) is strongly base-orderable if for every pair of bases B 1 , B 2 ∈ B there exists a bijection τ : B 1 → B 2 such that for every X ⊆ B 1 , we have B 1 − X + τ (X ) ∈ B. As in the previous example, a box-TDI description follows from (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 41.12e) . It is also known that the independent set polytope of the intersection of strongly base-orderable matroids has the integer decomposition property (McDiarmid 1983, eorem 5.1). 6 6.4 Non-symmetric matroid congestion games
In a non-symmetric matroid congestion game Γ = (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N , (c e ) e ∈E , the strategy set of player i is given by the bases B i of a matroid M i = (E, I i ) for i ∈ N . 7 e incidence vectors of the bases of B i can be described by the base matroid polytope
as introduced in the preliminaries.
at is, for every player we have a polytope of the form P i = {x : Ax ≤ b i , x ≥ 0} where b i is the rank function r i of the matroid M i . In particular, it follows that the aggregation polytope is given by
e polytope P N has a box-TDI description, which follows from (Schrijver 2003, eorem 46.2) . 8 e integer decomposition property is also satis ed (see, e.g., (Schrijver 2003, Corollary 46.2c) ). Using similar arguments as for r -arborescences, we can thus derive a strongly polynomial time algorithm to compute a minimum of Rosenthal's potential.
We also derive a result that is of independent interest: We can give a combinatorial approach for computing the symmetric di erence decomposition (which is of a speci c form) of non-symmetric matroid congestion games. Our analysis also gives rise to a strongly polynomial time local search algorithm that computes a global optimum of Rosenthal's potential function. is local search algorithm can be seen as a natural generalization of best-response dynamics. e details regarding these results will be given in the full version of the paper.
BOTTLENECK CONGESTION GAMES.
A bo leneck congestion game Γ = (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N , (c e ) e ∈E ) is de ned similar as a congestion game, with the only di erence that the objective of a player is to minimize the maximum (rather than the aggregated) congestion over all resources that she occupies. Formally, the cost of player i ∈ N under strategy pro le s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is given by C i (s) = max e ∈s i c e (x e ). Harks, Hoefer, Klimm, and Skopalik (2013) give a dual greedy algorithm to compute a strong equilibrium, which uses a strategy packing oracle as a subroutine.
ey give e cient packing oracles for symmetric network congestion games, non-symmetric matroid congestion games, and (a slight generalization of) r -arborescences. In particular, this leads to polynomial time algorithms for computing a strong equilibrium in these cases.
We adapt the algorithm in (Harks et al. 2013 ) to compute a load pro le of a strong equilibrium for bo leneck polytopal congestion games satisfying the IDP and box-TDI property. T 7.1 (A ). Let Γ = (N , E, (S i ) i ∈N , (c e ) e ∈E ) be a polytopal bo leneck congestion game with aggregation polytope P N that satis es the IDP and has a box-TDI description. en there is an algorithm for computing a load pro le of a strong equilibrium in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of a separation oracle of P N .
6 is also implies that the common base polytope has the integer decomposition property, since the integer decomposition property is preserved if we restrict ourselves to a face of a polytope with the integer decomposition property. 7 Our framework also captures the independent set congestion games studied by Del Pia et al. (2017) . However, we mainly focus on non-negative cost functions here (because of the ine ciency measures) and then these games are trivial. 8 To see this, we use the fact that the rank function is submodular and that the sum of submodular functions is again submodular. We can then apply eorem 46.2 in (Schrijver 2003 set N = N , u e = n for all e ∈ E, T = ∅, L = E and a = O(T ∪ L, (u e ) e ∈E ); while e ∈ L : u e > 0 ∅ do choose e ∈ argmax e ∈L:u e >0 {c e (u e )} u e := u e − 1; if O(T ∪ L, (u e ) e ∈E ) = NO then u e := u e + 1; L = L \ e , T = T ∪ {e } end a = O(T ∪ L, (u e ) e ∈E ) end return (u e ) e ∈E ;
We adapt the de nition of the strategy packing oracle of Harks et al. (2013) to load pro les: L Input: nite set of resources E = T ∪ L with upper bounds (u e ) e ∈E and n collections S 1 , . . . , S n ⊆ 2 E (given implicitly by a certain combinatorial property) Output:
, if there exists a feasible load pro le f such that f e = u e for all e ∈ T and f e ≤ u e for all e ∈ L; otherwise.
Our adaptation of the dual greedy algorithm in (Harks et al. 2013 ) is given in Algorithm 1. Although the ideas are similar to the ones in (Harks et al. 2013) , our algorithm only works with load pro les; in particular, we do not have to explicitly compute decompositions of feasible load pro les in intermediate steps of the algorithm (which signi cantly improves the running time).
Our algorithm works roughly as follows. We start with capacities of n on every resource. In every step we pick a resource e ∈ L with maximum cost among all resources that are called loose, and check whether there is a feasible load pro le if we reduce the capacity on e by one. If this is not possible, we remove e from L and add e to the set T of so-called tight resources. Note that a er the algorithm has terminated, all resources are in the set T . P T 7.1. It can be shown that Algorithm 1 computes a load pro le of a strong equilibrium (details will be given in the full version of the paper). It is clear that Algorithm 1 can be executed in time polynomial in n, m and the complexity of a load pro le oracle. We now give an e cient load pro le oracle, based on a separation oracle of P N . From the fact that P N has a box-TDI description, it follows that the polytope { : A ≤ i ∈N b i } ∩ { e = u e : e ∈ T } ∩ {0 ≤ e ≤ u e : e ∈ L} is integral. We can then use a separation oracle for P N to nd an integral vector in this polytope in time polynomial in n, m, size( i b i ) and the complexity of the separation oracle. is concludes the proof.
Once we have obtained the feasible load pro le, we can use an integer decomposition algorithm to nd the corresponding strategies of the players. If the integer decomposition can be done within the same time bounds as in eorem 7.1, we obtain a (strongly) polynomial algorithm for computing a strong equilibrium in a polytopal bo leneck congestion game. In particular, this applies to all applications mentioned in Section 6. 
